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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 33 Winter 1997 Number 2
NOTES
REFINING THE RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
CLAIM: BUSH v. VERA
I. INTRODUCTION
Supporters of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)' should find comfort in what
so decisively divides the Supreme Court in Bush v. Vera,' one of its most re-
cent racial gerrymander decisions. Until the announcement of Bush v. Vera,
many commentators expressed legitimate concern that the racial gerrymander
claim would roll back much of the VRA's progress The Court developed the
racial gerrymander claim in Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1)4 to place limits on the tra-
ditionally broad interpretation of the VRA. However, the racial gerrymandering
claim has evolved since Shaw v. Reno into the Court's approach in Bush v.
Vera, providing reassurance to VRA supporters and additional guidance to
drafters of congressional districts.
Beginning with the first racial gerrymander case in Shaw I, the same five
justices consistently voted together to comprise the same slim majority.5 How-
ever, this unity ended in Bush v. Vera when two justices broke rank in objec-
tion to the plurality's position on whether the creation of a majority-minority
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973gg-10 (1994)).
2. 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996).
3. "The thrust of the Supreme Court's recent opinions is clearly threatening to minority groups, the
Clinton Justice Department and others who have defended the new majority-minority districts as a means of
empowering minority voters.' Holly Idelson, It's Back to Drawing Board On Minority Districts, 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3065, 3067 (1995). "[Wlhat legislators once thought was their statutory obligation under the
Voting Rights Act---to shape majority-minority districts where possible and to state their intention to do
so-is now grounds for having all of their efforts struck down as unconstitutional.' Jamie B. Raskin, Affir-
mative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HoW. LJ. 521, 532 (1995).
4. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
5. Until the decision in Bush v. Vera, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thom-
as, and Scalia had always voted together in racial gerrymandering cases decided on the merits. See Shaw, 509
U.S. at 630 (5-4 decision); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995) (5-4 decision); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct.
1894 (1996) (5-4 decision), and compare with Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1941 (3-2-4 decision).
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district would, in itself, constitute a racial gerrymander.' The decision also
consisted of a number of concurring opinions, most significantly Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion to the plurality opinion she wrote. In her con-
curring opinion, Justice O'Connor revealed herself as the swing vote, emphasiz-
ing that she is prepared to vote in future racial gerrymander cases to protect
majority-minority districts and the VRA.
II. BUSH V. VERA
A. Facts and Procedural History
The 1990 census revealed that Texas' increase in population entitled the
state to three new Congressional seats.7 Thus, the Texas Legislature proceeded
with hearings and committee meetings to consider how they should incorporate
the new congressional districts.' The Legislature chose a plan which designated
all three of these new districts as majority-minority districts; two majority-His-
panic districts and one majority-African-American.9 Of the two new majority-
Hispanic districts, the Legislature located one in South Texas and another in
Houston." The Legislature established the new majority-African-American
district in Dallas." In addition to these newly created majority-minority dis-
tricts, the Legislature also substantially augmented an existing congressional
district in Houston to compensate its declining African-American population."
The Legislature accomplished this by drawing the new majority-Hispanic dis-
trict in Houston adjacent to the existing African-American district and concen-
trating each minority into their own district. 3 The State rationalized that this
segregation was necessary because the two groups had been voting differently,
and the State feared that unless they segregated the African-Americans from the
Hispanics, the two competing groups might not be able to elect a minority
representative. 4 The three-judge District Court in Vera v. Richards referred to
6. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' concurrence in the judgment but not in the reasoning. See
Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
7. "The increase in population from 1980 to 1990 (2,757,319 persons) entitled Texas to three additional
seats in the United States House of Representatives, increasing the size of the delegation from 27 to 30." Vera
v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1311 (S.D. Tex. 1994) affs sub non. Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996).
8. See id. at 1313-14.
9. See id. at 1315. The Legislature frankly explained the creation of the majority-minority districts in
their § 5 submission to the Department of Justice "entitled Narrative of Voting Rights Act Considerations in
Affected Districts prepared by the Texas Congressional Redistricting Staff.... As the document sets forth in





13. See id. at 1315-16.
14. See id. at 1316.
(The] breakdown of past coalitions [between African-Americans and Hispanics] prompted Hispanic
strategists to argue that Hispanics and African-Americans should not be combined in a new HarrisCounty Congressional district. As Houston City Councilman Ben Reyes testified at an outreach hear-ing held in Houston, combining minority groups in nearly equal numbers in a new Harris Countydistrict would be the "worst scenario" because "they will vote for members of their own ethnic
[Vol. 33:613
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these four districts as the "voting rights districts."'" The Legislature relied on
"Red Apple," a sophisticated software program used to precisely draw maps of
these new districts and to revise the lines of existing districts."
This Congressional Redistricting Plan adopted in House Bill 1 (HB1)'
led to litigation before it was passed into law. In Terrazas v. Slagle,'" Republi-
can plaintiffs sued officials of the State of Texas and the Texas Democratic
Party in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas claiming that
HB1 diluted the votes of racial, ethnic, and political minorities. 9 Plaintiffs
argued that the purpose of the plan was to dilute Hispanic and Republican vot-
ers in an effort to maximize the electoral success of Anglo-Democrat incum-
bents.' The District Court ruled for the defendants by holding that HB1 did
not dilute the votes of racial, ethnic, and political minorities.2
Subsequently, the Legislature passed the reapportionment plan which the
Governor signed into law in August, 1991.' Texas has been a covered juris-
diction under the VRA since 1975,' and as such, the State must submit for
approval all changes that affect any voting procedure." The Department of
Justice approved the new reapportionment plan in November 1991, but the
Attorney General expressed the following sentiments regarding the reapportion-
ment plan: "While we are preclearing this plan under Section 5, the ex-
traordinary convoluted nature of some districts compels me to disclaim any
implication that the proposed plan is otherwise lawful or constitutional." In
January 1994, six Republican voters' filed suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas seeking injunctions and declaratory judgment,
claiming that 24 out of Texas' 30 congressional districts were the product of
racial gerrymanderingY The plaintiffs named state officers as defendants, in-
cluding the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, the Secretary
group, making it more likely that a nonminority candidate will win."
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 1331.
16. See id. at 1314.
17. This bill adopted Plan C657. See id. at 1309, nl. However, other districting plans were available,
most notably the following three: Dr. Weber's plan, Plan C676 called for two African-American districts and
six Hispanic districts; The Owens-Plate plan, Plan C606, called for up to two new African-American districts
and two Hispanic districts; Senator Johnson's plan, C500, would have disturbed a number of incumbents but
according to one expert would have been "a fairer plan than the plan the legislature adopted." Id. at 1330-31.
18. 821 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
19. See id.; see also Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1314 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
20. See Terrazas, 821 F.Supp. at 1162.
21. See id.
22. See Vera, 1304 F.Supp. at 1309.
23. See id. at 1317. See also 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (1995) (listing all of the covered jurisdictions in the
nation).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
25. Vera, 861 F.Supp. at 1309.
26. Al Vera, the first plaintiff is an Hispanic who taught high school for thirty years and who has been a
political activist. In 1978, Al Vera ran for Congress in District 18, the majority-African-American district in
Houston, and lost to an African-American candidate. "Vera ran as a protest candidate, saying that the districts
amounted to segregation." The plaintiffs referred to themselves as the "Coalition for a Color Blind Texas."
The group "include[d] blacks, Hispanics and an Asian American:' Alan Bernstein, "Racial Gerrymandering"
Trial Set this WeeklLawsuit Has Implications for State, Nation, HOUSTON CHRON., June 26, 1994.
27. See Vera, 861 F.Supp. at 1310.
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of State and the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives.28
Litigation ensued in 1994, and the three-judge district courte 9 held in Vera
v. Richards that three of the twenty-four challenged districts constituted uncon-
stitutional racial gerrymandering.' All of the "Voting Rights Districts" were
found unconstitutional except for District 28, the majority-Hispanic district in
South Texas.3 The district court determined that although District 28 was a
majority-minority district, it was not racial gerrymandering because "District 28
is not highly irregularly shaped."'32
At the trial level in Vera v. Richards, the district court heard testimony that
the Texas Legislature did not use what are considered "traditional districting
principles such as natural geographic boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and
conformity to political subdivisions"'33 because Texas had never relied on these
traditional districting principles in the past.'4 In lieu of traditional consider-
ations, the state claimed that the Legislature's focus on incumbency protection,
rather than on race, led to the bizarrely shaped districts. The state explained that
race was only considered to the extent necessary to avoid liability under either
section 2 or section 5 of the VRA.'
Among the items of evidence considered by the district court, the most
telling were the bizarre drafting of congressional districts 18, 29, and 30, VRA
§ 5 submissions to the Department of Justice for preclearance proceedings, and
testimony of a state senator in earlier litigation.36 Based on this evidence, the
district court concluded the Shaw I cause of action applied because the bizarre
contours of congressional districts 18, 29, and 30 were unexplainable in terms
other than race.37 The district court dismissed the state's argument that the bi-
zarre contours of the districts exist as an effort to protect incumbents, asserting
that "[i]ncumbent protection is a valid state interest only to the extent that it is
not a pretext for unconstitutional racial gerrymandering."38 Upon establishing
the excessive use of racial considerations, the district court determined that the
three districts were the result of racial gerrymanders, and therefore according to
Shaw I, strict scrutiny applied. The district court found that the challenged
districts did not meet the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny, and the
districts were ruled unconstitutional.39
28. See id. at 1310.
29. Whenever a case involves a constitutional challenge to congressional redistricting, a three-judge
United States District Court is mandated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
30. See Vera, 861 F.Supp. at 1344.
31. See id.
32. Id. "The Legislature took no extraordinary measures that rendered this district so out of line with
traditional districting criteria as to raise a serious question about racial gerrymandering." Id.
33. Id. at 1333.
34. Due to the enormous size of the State of Texas, it is difficult for legislators "to fit Congressional
districts perfectly within single geographic regions." Id.
35. Section 2 is found in Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a&b. Section 5
is found in Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973c.
36. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1956-57 (1996).
37. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1339-41 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
38. Id. at 1336.
39. See id. at 1342.
[Vol. 33:613
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The defendant and intervenors appealed, which in cases involving redis-
tricting of congressional seats calls for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.'
By the time this case reached the Supreme Court, Texas had elected a new
governor. The case name reflected this change by deleting former Governor
Richard's name as the first defendant and replacing it with the name of the new
governor, George Bush Jr., thus explaining the change of the case name from
Vera v. Richards at the trial level to Bush v. Vera at the appellate level. Several
additional parties41 had intervened on the side of the defendants in Vera v.
Richards but only two of these intervenors participated in Bush v. Vera: the
United States and the NAACP.42
B. Issues on Appeal
In Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision
in Vera v. Richards by addressing three issues. Although the Supreme Court
affirmed, it defined the issues slightly differently because new precedent had
been established since the district court issued its decision. First, the Supreme
Court considered whether the plaintiffs had standing according to the recent
decision in United States v. Hays,' which substantially narrowed the require-
ments for standing in racial gerrymander claims.' Next, the Supreme Court
reviewed the district court record to determine whether race was the predomi-
nant factor in reapportionment of the challenged districts according to the recent
decision in Miller v. Johnson.4' Finally, if the challenged districts constituted
racial gerrymanders, the Court had to decide whether the statute passed strict
scrutiny.
The issues in Bush v. Vera were similar to the issues in previous racial
gerrymandering cases, including the companion case Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II).'
However, the facts of the case forced members of the Court to take positions
that previous racial gerrymandering cases did not demand. A quick survey of
voting rights jurisprudence before Bush v. Vera is necessary to understand the
significance of the Court's decision in the case.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
41. See Vera, 861 F.Supp at 1310. Intervenors at the District Court included. the United States, the
NAACP Legal Defence and Educational Fund, Inc. ("Lawson Intervenors"), The League of United Latin
American Citizens ("LULAC"), and seven hispanic registered voter members of LULAC. Id.
42. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996).
43. 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995).
44. See id.
45. 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
46. 116S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
1997]
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I1. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. The Sword & the Shield: Voting Rights Jurisprudence before Shaw I
The VRA guaranteed meaningful minority participation in the voting pro-
cess through a two step approach. The first step eliminated poll taxes,47 litera-
cy tests," and other devices that hindered access to the polls.49 However, this
alone was meaningless if states and municipalities could draw electoral districts
to dilute minority votes. Upon removing these barriers to the polls, the drafters
of the VRA anticipated efforts to dilute minority votes would increase, so the
VRA contained language providing for the vote dilution claim. °
The VRA offers protection against minority vote dilution, through sections
2 and 5, which commentators have referred to respectively as a "sword" and a
"shield." '51 Section 2, the sword, provides a cause of action to challenge any
electoral district that dilutes minority votes.52 On the other hand, section 5
does not grant a cause of action, rather it provides for a preclearance procedure
before a covered jurisdiction may change any aspect of its voting system. 3
Thus, section 5 functions as a shield against any retrogression to past discrimi-
natory activities.
Together, sections 2 and 5 have attacked and guarded against minority vote
dilution efforts, although the power of section 2 has increased significantly as a
result of the 1982 Amendment to the VRA. The 1980 decision of Mobile v.
Bolden 4 required proof of intentional discrimination before prevailing on a
section 2 vote dilution claim. This requirement substantially hindered claims, so
Congress amended the VRA in 1982 to require satisfaction of the results test
only, eliminating the intent test required in Mobile v. Bolden.5 Now a section
2 claim prevails if an electoral system simply "results" in minority vote dilu-
tion, regardless of the drafters' intent. 6 Multimember districts inherently have
a dilutive effect, so they have largely been eliminated through section 2 vote
dilution claims."
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (1994).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
49. See id.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
51. See, eg., Heather K. Way, Note, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the
Argument for the Incorporation of Section 2, 74 TEx.L.REv. 1439 (1996).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §1973.
53. See 42 U.S.C. §1973c.
54. 446 U.S. 55 (1980)(superseded by statute).
55. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15-16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192-193; Thomburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1985).
56. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 71-74.
57. See Barbara L. Berry & Thomas R. Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7
FLA.ST.U.L.REV. 85 (1979).
58. See David F. Walbert, Georgia's Experience with the Voting Rights Act: Past, Present, and Future,
44 EMORY U. 979, 1023 (1995). See also Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He
Had Said: "When It Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's The Only Thing", 14 CARDOZO
L.REv. 1237, 1245 (1993) (explaining why single member districts are naturally the most appropriate remedy
[Vol. 33:613
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Today, section 2 litigation increasingly involves single member districts,
and has a greater likelihood of success than prior to 1982 Amendment. 9 As a
result, states approached congressional redistricting after the 1990 census cau-
tiously, attempting to avoid section 2 vote dilution claims.' At the same time,
the Department of Justice applied pressure to states by withholding section 5
preclearance in an effort to compel them into drafting a larger number of major-
ity-rninority districts.6' The caution on the behalf of states combined with the
Department of Justice's coaxing led a number of states to create majority-mi-
nority districts with a total disregard to traditional districting principles.
B. Round One: Creation Of The Racial Genymander Claim
1. The Shaw I Decision
Shaw ,62 decided in 1993, constitutes the first of three rounds of litigation
alleging that consideration of racial demographics in reapportionment schemes
may be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. Since the develop-
ment of this racial gerrymandering claim, no challenged district has survived
the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny review. 3 Shaw I arose from the North Car-
olina General Assembly's effort to avoid liability under section 5 of the VRA
by creating two majority-minority congressional districts." However, the draft-
ers of these two districts went to extreme measures to create a majority number
of African-Americans in each district, leading to bizarrely shaped districts.'
Portions of one district were no wider than the highway it followed to connect
pockets of densely populated African-Americans.'
to minorities submerged in a multimember district plan).
59. See Grofnan, supra note 58, at 1240-41.
60. In the South, the number of majority-black congressional districts increased by a dozen in 1992 as a
result of the 1982 Amendment to the VRA and states' efforts to avoid section 2 liability. See Clinton Keeps
Southern Wing On His Team in 1993, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC app. C at 23 (1993). In 1994, fifty-two con-
gressional districts were either majority-black or majority-hispanic. See Electing Minorities, 4 CONG. Q. RE-
sEARcHER 697, 705 (Aug. 12, 1994). In 1994 majority-black congressional districts existed in: Alabama (1),
Florida (3), Georgia (3), nlinois (3), Louisiana (2), Maryland (2), Michigan (2), Mississippi (1), Missouri
(1),New Jersey (1), New York (3), North Carolina (2), Ohio (1), Pennsylvania (2), outh Carolina (1), Ten-
nessee (1), Texas (2), Virginia (1). See id. Majority-hispanic congressional districts exist in: Arizona (1),
Florida (2), California (7), Illinois (1), New York (2), Texas (7). See id.
61. For example, the Louisiana legislature created a second majority-minority district out of a belief that
the VRA compelled such action.
This belief was encouraged, if not demanded, by the Department of Justice, under an actual or im-
plied threat of withholding Section 5 preclearance. The shield became a sword. Whether the Attorney
General had the right to withhold pre-clearance may be open to question, but she certainly had the
power, and the threat, whether issued by her or some middle level bureaucrat, was a matter of real
concern to the State. Litigation in the District of Columbia, and everywhere else is expensive. We
hold, however, that a real concern is not a compelling one.
Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F.Supp. 119, 123, n3. (W.D. La. 1994), vacated, United States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct.
2431 (1995)(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing).
62. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
63. See generally id.; Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996);
Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996).
64. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633.
65. See id. at 635.
66. See id. at 635.
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The three-judge district court dismissed appellant's claim for failure to
state a claim, thus the Supreme Court's only consideration in Shaw I was
whether the appellants had stated a cognizable claim.67 The Court examined
the facts and precedent to conclude that appellants "may state a claim by alleg-
ing that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justifica-
tion."' The Court recognized that harm occurs when a district is drafted solely
according to race, thereby "reinforc[ing] racial stereotypes and threaten[ing] to
undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected offi-
cials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency
as a whole." The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and re-
manded the case to be considered according to their decision.70 However, this
case left many questions unanswered, namely "whether 'the intentional creation
of majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal
protection claim." '71
2. Competing Principles Behind The Vote Dilution Claim & The Racial
Gerrymandering Claim
Remarkably, voting rights litigation is just as common in the 1990s as it
was in the 1960s; although the focus of voting rights litigation has changed. To
fully appreciate the racial gerrymander claim and its inherent conflicts with the
VRA, it is essential to examine the racial gerrymander's underlying rationales
and how they sometimes conflict with the VRA. The most common points of
contention are the validity of the harm addressed by the racial gerryinander
claim and the tension between traditional districting principles and proportional
representation.
Harm is a necessary element for any cause of action; however, the harm in
a racial gerrymander is elusive and difficult for many to conceptualize. Before
the racial gerrymandering claim, the only equal protection claim addressing
apportionment was the vote dilution claim.' The vote dilution claim addressed
"material harm to the voting strength of an identifiable (and constitutionally
protected) group," i.e., when a minority group's votes are submerged to the
extent that they could never elect a candidate with their own votes. On the
other hand, the "expressive harn '74 identified by the racial gerrymander claim
67. See id. at 634.
68. Id. at 649.
69. Id. at 650.
70. See Id. at 658.
71. Id. at 649 (quoting White, J., dissenting).
72. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluation Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.L.RE v. 483 (1993).
73. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 72, at 493.
74. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 72, at 506-07 ("[Ain expressive harm is one that results from the ideas
or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material conse-
quences the action brings about").
[Vol. 33:613
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in Shaw I is not as concrete nor as easily explained as the material harm in a
vote dilution case.' The expressive harm identified by the majority in Shaw I
is comprised of "[s]ignificant deviations from traditional districting principles,
such as the bizarre shape and noncompactness demonstrated by the districts ....
caus[ing] constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message that political
identity is, or should be, predominantly racial."'76 A number of Justices and
commentators view the harm addressed by the racial gerrymander claim as a
pretext to undermine the VRA. Hence, validity of the harm is a point of conten-
tion in all racial gerrymander cases.
Two philosophical approaches to representation collide when state legisla-
tors draw electoral districts.7 In the past, the aspiration was to draw electoral
districts according to geography, and this served to unite constituents providing
the basis for their representation. However, with the advent of the VRA, ge-
ography has been downplayed to accommodate the VRA's quasi-proportional
representation demanding that some electoral districts be drawn to represent a
minority interest group within the district.79 In Shaw I, the traditional geo-
graphic approach to redistricting challenged the VRA's goal of quasi-propor-
tional representation, and the traditional approach prevailed."
C. Round Two: "Predominant Factor" Analysis & Standing Requirement
Miller v. Johnson expanded on the Shaw I doctrine. Shaw I established that
bizarre districting, unexplainable but for race, will give rise to a racial gerry-
mandering claim. However, Miller explained that a racial gerrymander claim
exists whenever it is determined that race was used as the "predominant factor"
among other districting factors.8" The challenged congressional district in Mill-
er was not as bizarrely shaped as in Shaw I; nevertheless, the Court established
that racial considerations "predominated" over traditional districting factors.8 2
Georgia is a "covered jurisdiction" under the VRA, and as such, it is sub-
ject to preclearance under section 5 of the VRA.' The Georgia Legislature
submitted two proposals for preclearance to the Department of Justice, which
denied both because they did not utilize a plan proposing at least three majori-
75. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 72, at 506-07.
76. Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1962 (1996).
77. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 72, at 483.
78. See id.
79. The VRA explicitly provides that no right exists to proportional representation. "[Nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). However, drafters of electoral districts seeking to avoid a vote dilu-
tion claim must employ proportional representation to a certain extent.
80. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 72, at 484.
81. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2457, 2488 (1995).
82. See id. at 2490.
83. "In 1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act. In consequence, § 5 of the Act requires Georgia to obtain either administrative preclearance by
the Attorney General or approval by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of any
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ty-minority districts. 4 The legislature could have submitted the preclearance
application to the District Court for the District of Columbia rather than the
Department of Justice, but the legislature chose not to seek judicial approval.85
Instead, the legislature simply adopted the "max-black" plan suggested by the
Department of Justice." The "max-black" plan included the challenged district
in Miller, which the Court held to be unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.
Miller explained that the Department of Justice inappropriately demanded
that Georgia create a third majority-minority district to comply with section 5,
and that to consider the Justice Department's rejection as "compelling" would
surrender the judiciary's "role in enforcing... constitutional limits" to the
Executive Branch." The "nonretrogression" requirement of section 5 essential-
ly provides that existing minority representation should not diminish under the
new reapportionment plan.88 As the Court accurately pointed out, section 5
does not require the creation of majority-minority districts where the minority
representation has not diminished and where majority-minority districts did not
exist before reapportionment.89
Section 5 is only invoked when minority representation suffers a setback
through reapportionment. However, Georgia's previously submitted
plans-which required only two rather than three majority-minority dis-
tricts-would not have served as a setback to existing minority representation.
Therefore, the Court determined that the Justice Department inaccurately inter-
preted section 5 of the VRA, so that Georgia's compliance with this interpreta-
tion was not narrowly tailored to meet strict scrutiny."
Miller distinguishes itself from Shaw I because the challenged district in
Miller was not as bizarrely shaped as the challenged district in Shaw I; actually,
the challenged district in Miller was relatively compact.9 However, evidence
84. See id. at 2483-84.
85. See id. at 2484. "The State did not seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia." Id.
86. The "max-black" plan was one of the alternative plans proposing three majority-minority districts
that the Department of Justice suggested Georgia adopt. See id. at 2484.
87. Id. at 2491. "The congressional plan challenged here was not required by the Voting Rights Act
under a correct reading of the statute." Id. "In utilizing § 5 to require States to create majority-minority dis-
tricts wherever possible, the Department of Justice expanded its authority under the statute beyond what Con-
gress intended and we have upheld." Id. at 2493.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 2490-94.
90. "The undisputed loser in Miller, therefore, is the federal government, and especially the Justice De-
partment. The direct association between the preclearance powers under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
the 'max-black' plan of the ACLU, and the black caucus of the Georgia legislature served to turn the Justice
Department into a suspect interest group advocate no different from the Richmond City Council in Croson.
While there is more than a touch of irony in the Justice Department under President Bush being depicted as a
'captured' agent of the ACLU, Miller is an integral part of the Court's reevaluation of the role of the federal
government's presumed immunity from faction-dominated politics." (citation omitted) Samuel Issacharoff, The
Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 45, 52-53 (1995).
91. When comparing the map of the challenged district in Miller to the map of the challenged district in
Shaw 1, each district has a distinctively different shape. The challenged district in Shaw I was long and thin,
resembling a snake slithering between several districts and adjacent to many others. See Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, app. (1993). Whereas, the challenged district in Miller was more cohesive and not as serpentine. See
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, app. (1995).
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of preclearance efforts revealed that race was the "predominant factor" in draw-
ing the district.' Thus, the racial gerrymander claim began to address not only
districts that were bizarrely shaped but also those that utilized race as a "prima-
ry factor" in their drafting. However, this modified standard announced in Mill-
er falls short of providing adequate guidance. As one commentator laments,
"the use of 'predominant' to demarcate the measure of unconstitutionality does
little to elucidate the exact notion of causation that triggers constitutional infir-
mity. 9
3
United States v. Hays, the companion case to Miller, provides virtually no
additional guidance regarding the racial gerrymandering claim. Hays simply
established that to have standing in a racial gerrymandering case the plaintiff
must reside in the district that is challenged.94 The plaintiffs in Hays did not
reside in the challenged district so the Court remanded the case with instruc-
tions to dismiss for lack of standing.'
D. Round Three: Bush v. Vera and Shaw v. Hunt
Bush v. Vera and Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw If) 6 are companion cases. Shaw II
is a continuation of the litigation initiated in Shaw L In Shaw I, the Court con-
sidered the three-judge district court's decision to dismiss for failure to state an
equal protection claim.' Although the Shaw I Court resolved that an equal
protection claim did exist and defined the parameters of the new cause of ac-
tion, the Court remanded the case to be reevaluated according to the new
law.98
Shaw II resulted from the remand of Shaw I by the Supreme Court. How-
ever, instead of considering both of the majority-minority districts that were
challenged in Shaw I, only one of these districts, District 12, was challenged in
Shaw II because appellants lacked standing in the other district." Remarkably,
the three-judge district court in Shaw II found that although the North
Carolina's reapportionment plan was subject to strict scrutiny, the plan indeed
met the strict scrutiny standard." The Supreme Court reversed the district
court's Shaw II decision holding that the challenged reapportionment plan was
92. "It is apparent that it was not alleged shared interests but rather the object of maximizing the
District's black population and obtaining Justice Department approval that in fact explained the General
Assembly's actions." Id. at 2490.
93. Issacharoff, supra note 90, at 57. "Unfortunately, by turning to tort-like concepts of causation, the
Court is taking a difficult and unresolved area of constitutional law and saddling it with a segment of the
common law that has been caustically termed the 'last refuge of muddy thinkers.'" Id.(quoting Kenneth Vin-
son, Proximate Cause Should Barred From Wandering Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA.ST.U.L.REV. 215
(1985)).
94. See United States v. Hayes, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2436 (1995).
95. See id. at 2437.
96. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
97. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-37 (1993).
98. See id.
99. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996).
100. See Shaw, 861 F.Supp. at 408.
1997]
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not narrowly tailored under the strict scrutiny standard.'0'
IV. BUSH V. VERA DECISION
Bush v. Vera is a plurality opinion, followed by three concurring opinions
and two dissenting opinions. The Court affirmed Vera v. Richards while bor-
rowing language and doctrines developed in Miller. 2 Issued in 1994, Vera v.
Richards was decided one year before the Court announced the modifications to
the Shaw I cause of action in Miller (1995). The Court grappled with the twist
that Miller added, and among other issues rendered the most fractured decision
yet. This decision is the only one to date that considers the Shaw I cause of
action without reaching a majority opinion. Even Shaw HI, the companion case,
is a majority opinion.
A. Bush v. Vera: Plurality Opinion
The plurality easily found standing since at least one of the six plaintiffs
resided in each of the challenged districts to satisfy the bright line standing
requirement announced in Hays."°3 Upon establishing standing, the plurality
addressed the more complicated issues of the racial gerrymandering claim be-
ginning with the predominant factor analysis.
1. Predominant Factor Analysis
The plurality explained that using race as a factor in drawing congressional
districts does not in itself give rise to strict scrutiny.' Rather, "[flor strict
scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other legitimate districting prin-
ciples were subordinated to race."'' "° The plurality reviewed the district court's
determination that race had been the predominant factor in drawing the three
challenged districts. The district court reached its conclusion with the assistance
of, among other things, evidence including preclearance submissions to the
Department of Justice,"° the computer software with exacting compilations of
racial data, and the neglect of traditional districting criteria." The plurality
concluded that all of this evidence in totality contributed to the determination
that race was the primary factor in drawing each of the three challenged con-
gressional districts.'
The plurality first examined District 30 in Dallas to determine conclusively
101. See Shaw, 116 S.Ct. at 1894.
102. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996).
103. See id. at 1951.
104. See id.
105. See id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.CL 2475, 2488 (1995).
106. The VRA mandates that a number of states, including Texas, that have a history of denying political
access to people based on race, must submit any changes in voting procedure to the department of Justice or
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
107. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1953.
108. See id. at 1941.
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whether race predominated as a consideration in drawing this district. Examina-
tion of the VRA section 5 submission to the Department of Justice and consid-
eration of the testimony in an earlier political gerrymandering suit led to the
determination that race was the predominant factor in drawing District 30."°
The plurality asserted that the use of sophisticated computer software to draw
the challenged congressional district was the most significant evidence, ° and
resolved that "[tihe combination of these factors compels us to agree with the
District Court that 'the contours of Congressional District 30 are unexplainable
in terms other than race."""
The appellants claimed that incumbency protection, and not race, was the
predominant factor in drafting District 30.112 The plurality entertained this ar-
gument to a certain extent, but in the end found it self-defeating."' According
to the plurality, even if incumbency protection was among the primary objec-
tives in redistricting, District 30 would still be subject to strict scrutiny because
race was improperly used as a proxy for incumbency protection and necessarily
predominated over other considerations." 4 While the plurality acknowledged
that they "have not subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny""' 5 in
the past, this situation apparently distinguished itself because political gerry-
mandering used race as a proxy.
The plurality next considered the African-American district and the His-
panic district in Houston, and concluded that their shapes were so bizarre and
unexplainable, on any grounds other than race, that they were presumptively
unconstitutional."6 The plurality stressed that these two districts in Houston
were among the "three least regular districts in the country."".7 This irregu-
larity revealed a total disregard for traditional districting principles, and support-
ed the plurality's assertion that race was the predominant factor. The plurality
reasoned that if traditional districting principles were not used, then the predom-
inant factor must have been race."8
In contrast to the plurality's consideration of the challenged district in
Dallas, the plurality entirely dismissed the appellants' argument that incumben-
cy protection predominated in the creation of the two Houston districts."9 The
legislature's division of African-Americans and Hispanics into two adjacent
districts confirmed that race was the predominant factor in drawing the two
challenged districts located in Houston."'° The plurality resolved that the cre-
109. See id. at 1957.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1958.
112. See id. at 1955.
113. See id. at 1954-58.
114. See id. at 1957.
115. Id. at 1954 (referring to Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986)).
116. See id. at 1959-60.
117. Id. at 1958.
118. See id.
119. "The record evidence of the racial demographics ... belies any suggestion that party politics could
explain the dividing lines between the two districts." Id. at 1959.
120. "Mhe district lines correlate almost perfectly with race." Id.
1997]
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ation of adjacent majority-minority districts, one for African-Americans and one
for Hispanics, is "ultimately unexplainable on grounds other than racial quota
established for those districts.''
2. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Upon establishing that race was a predominate factor in drawing all three
of the challenged districts and that each was thus a racial gerrymander, the
plurality applied strict scrutiny." For the purpose of analysis, the plurality
assumed that a compelling government interest existed and then concentrated on
whether the districts were narrowly tailored."2 Without even reaching the
question of whether the challenged districts met a compelling interest, the plu-
rality determined the districts did not meet the narrowly tailored require-
ment.
24
While acknowledging that avoiding a section 2 vote dilution claim was a
compelling interest, the plurality determined that the Texas legislature had not
narrowly tailored the challenged districts to avoid section 2 liability. Section 2
liability, i.e. vote dilution, exists when the Gingles'" threshold requirements
are met. Without evaluating the districts under all three of the threshold require-
ments, the plurality determined that none of the challenged districts even met
the first threshold requirement."
The first requirement of the Gingles criteria to establish a section 2 claim
requires that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district."'" None of the minority groups occupying the three chal-
lenged districts exhibited the quality of being "geographically compact," so the
Texas Legislature could not claim that it was necessary to create these bizarre
districts to avoid a vote dilution claim under section 2.' Regardless of
whether the other threshold requirements were met, the plurality concluded that
the Texas Legislature had not narrowly tailored the challenged districts to avoid
a section 2 vote dilution claim.'29 The plurality stated, "[section] 2 does not
require a State to create, on predominately racial lines, a district that is not 'rea-
sonably compact. ' ' ' ..
Next the plurality addressed the appellants' argument that the compelling
state interest in remedying past and present racial discrimination was narrowly




125. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986). Not until the 1992 Term did the Supreme Court
definitively hold that the Gingles criteria also control VRA challenges to single-member district plans. See
Pildes & Niemi supra note 72, at 488.
126. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1961 (1996).
127. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50.
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tailored.' The appellants explained that remedial measures were necessary to
counter Anglo voters who consistently "bloc" voted against Hispanic and Afri-
can-American candidates.' The plurality found that this "bloc" voting result-
ed in the same harm as that created in vote dilution.' Subsequently, the
Court analogized the interest in remedying past and present racial discrimination
to the interest in avoiding section 2 vote dilution claims." After making this
comparison, the Court explained that just as the interest in avoiding section 2
vote dilution liability was not narrowly tailored, neither was the interest in
remedying past and present racial discrimination. 3'
The last compelling interest offered by the appellants regarded the
nonretrogression requirement of section 5 of the VRA"s Districts 29 and 30
were created after the 1990 census, but District 18 had been in existence for
two decades. Thus, the section 5 nonretrogression standard, which applies to
previously existing districts, only applied to District 18.2' The plurality
agreed with the appellants' argument that avoiding section 5 liability can be a
compelling interest.' However, the plurality asserted that the state went be-
yond the nonretrogression requirement of section 5 by seeking continued elec-
toral success of minorities in District 18 even though section 5 does not man-
date this. 39 According to the plurality, section 5 only demands "that the
minority's opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished,
directly or indirectly, by the State's actions."'" The Texas Legislature went
beyond mere protection against nonretrogression, mandated by section 5, to
actually insure the continued success of the majority-minority district.'
Therefore, the plurality explained that the district is not narrowly tailored to
avoid section 5 liability. 42
131. See id. Eliminating the effects of past racial discrimination is "a compelling interest entirely distinct
from the Voting Rights Act." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993). The Court has "previously recognized
a significant interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination.' Id.
132. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1962.
133. See id. at 1962-63.
134. See id. at 1963.
135. See id. Regarding remedying past racial discrimination, the plurality states that they "have indicated
that such problems will not justify race-based districting unless 'the State employ[s] sound districting princi-
ples, and ... the affected racial group's residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in
which they will be in the majority." Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)(quoting United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977)).
136. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1963.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. "The problem with the State's argument is that it seeks to justify not maintenance, but sub-
stantial augmentation, of the African-American population percentage in District 18." Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. "A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression
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B. Array Of Concurring Opinions
Only when the Court determines that a legislature used race as the predom-
inant factor in redistricting will the Court find a racial gerrymander.43 Subse-
quently, the racial gerrymander is subjected to strict scrutiny.'" Given the
reputation for strict scrutiny to be "strict in scrutiny and fatal in fact," the criti-
cal issue is whether a racial gerrymander is identified. Until recently, all Su-
preme Court decisions left unanswered the question of whether the intentional
creation of a majority-minority district in itself was prima facie evidence that
race predominated in redistricting and that the district was thus a racial gerry-
mander.4 To date, Bush v. Vera is the only Supreme Court decision to shed
light on this issue.
Beginning with the initial racial gerrymander case, Shaw I, the Court has
consistently decided every racial gerrymander case, but one, on the merits,'"
with the same five justices comprising the majority. 47 This consistent string
of majority decisions ended with Bush v. Vera. Until Shaw I, none of these five
justices had ever committed themselves one way or another as to whether the
creation of a majority-minority district in itself was a racial gerrymander.'"
Their consideration of this issue led to the fractured opinion in Bush v. Vera.
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, declaring that strict scrutiny
does not "apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts." 49 Thus the intentional creation of a majority-minority district alone
will not qualify as a racial gerrymander unless additional evidence reveals that
race was the predominant factor in redistricting. The plurality resolved any
conflict between this conclusion and the holding of Adarand Construction, Inc.
v. Pena5° by referring to the different context. Adarand considers a statute
that made specific references to race in an effort to establish set-aside pro-
grams.' In contrast, Bush v. Vera examines race neutral electoral lines, estab-
lished through legislation that simply establishes the dimensions and coordinates
of new congressional districts with no mention of race." Any determination
143. See id. at 1951. See also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995) (establishing the predominant-
factor analysis to determine whether an electoral district is a racial gerrymander).
144. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996). See also Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 630 (establishing the
strict scrutiny standard for racial gerrymanders).
145. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995); United
States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995).
146. United States v. Hays, was the only Supreme Court decision regarding racial gerrymandering that
was not decided on the merits. The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not reside
in the challenged district. See United States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995).
147. The five Justices in the majority are Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia.
148. "Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that,
on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view
on whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal
protection claim" Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 631 (1996).
149. Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1951 (referring to Dewitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994)("[S]trict
scrutiny did not apply to an intentionally created compact majority-minority district.")).
150. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
151. See id. at 205.
152. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1950.
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of the use of race in drawing the congressional districts requires an investiga-
tion into the legislative history."' The plurality offers the explanation of these
different contexts to show how Bush v. Vera and Adarand can coexist.
Justice O'Connor's conclusion, that the intentional creation of a majority-
minority district alone does not automatically qualify as a racial gerrymander,
fractured the Court's majority leading to a plurality decision." While Justices
Thomas and Scalia concurred in the judgment, they did not join the plurality's
opinion because they specifically objected to "Justice O'Connor's assertion that
strict scrutiny is not invoked by the intentional creation of majority-minority
districts."'"5 Justice Thomas wrote, and Justice Scalia joined, the concurring
opinion which concurred in judgment but not in reasoning.
Although Justice Thomas acknowledged "the evidentiary difficulty of
proving that a redistricting plan is, in fact, a racial gerrymander,"'56 he did not
accept the plurality's explanation for not applying strict scrutiny "to all cases of
intentional creation of majority-minority districts."'" Justice Thomas ex-
plained that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts necessarily
subordinates traditional race-neutral districting principles and that therefore the
"legislature has classified persons on the basis of race."'58 In his concurrence,
he reminds the plurality that "[sitrict scrutiny applies to all governmental classi-
fications based on race, and we have expressly held that there is no exception
for race-based redistricting.' 51 9
Addressing the same issue as Justice Thomas, but in a distinctly different
way, Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion. Although Justice Kenne-
dy joined the plurality opinion, in his concurring opinion he objected to the
plurality even addressing the issue of whether the intentional creation of a ma-
jority-minority district in itself constituted a racial gerrymander."6 According
to Justice Kennedy, the facts in this case did not require the plurality to address
this question, so it was not necessary to have elaborated.' Because in this
case the plurality had found that race predominated with overwhelming evi-
dence, regardless of the intentional creation of a majority-minority districts, the
153. While Adarand clearly states that "classifications based explicitly on race" will invoke strict scrutiny.
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213. The plurality in Bush explained that "[e]lectoral lines are 'facially neutral,' so
a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases."
Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1951. The "searching inquiry" referred to by the plurality is the "predominant factor" anal-
ysis initiated in Miller and is necessary because electoral district lines are not per se classifications of race, as
set aside programs are in Adarand. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1951. See also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213; Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995).
154. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1951.
155. Id. at 1972 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
156. Id. at 1973.
157. Id. at 1951. Thomas said, "We have never suggested that a racial gerrymander is subject to anything
less than strict scrutiny." Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
158. Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). "[A] majority-minority district is created 'because
of,' and not merely 'in spite of' racial demographics. when that occurs, traditional race-neutral districting
principles are necessarily subordinated (and race necessarily predominates), and the legislature has classified
persons on the basis of race. The resulting redistricting must be viewed as a racial gerrymander." Id.
159. Id.
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plurality did not need to address whether the intentional creation of a majority-
minority district created a racial gerrymander. In the plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor relied on the district court decision, DeWitt v. Wilson, 62 which held
that "strict scrutiny did not apply to an intentionally created compact majority-
minority district" to buttress her contention." However, Justice Kennedy
trivialized this support by explaining that this was not the issue in DeWitt and
"that our summary affirmance in DeWitt stands for no proposition other than
that the districts reviewed there were constitutional. We do not endorse the
reasoning of the district court when we order summary affirmance of the judg-
ment.
, 164
In addition to writing the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor concurred
separately. 65 Her concurring opinion re-emphasized her commitment to the
divisive principle which fractured the previously consistent majority in racial
gerrymander cases." In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor reiterated that
"States may intentionally create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise
take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny."'67 Justice
O'Connor also addressed an additional issue which was not in the case, but that
nevertheless she believed needed clarification.'1e
The Court has always assumed that there was a compelling interest in
compliance with section 2 of the VRA when conducting the strict scrutiny
analysis of a racial gerrymander. However, because the narrowly tailored re-
quirement has never been satisfied, the issue of whether the assumed compel-
ling interest in compliance with section 2 could ever be an actual compelling
interest has never been reached.69 Justice O'Connor identified this unan-
swered question as deserving attention and asserted "that States and lower
courts are entitled to more definite guidance as they toil with the twin demands
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act."'o7 Justice
O'Connor briefly examined the history of section 2 and concluded that it is not
only constitutional but also that "the States have a compelling interest with the
results test as this Court has interpreted it.'' Although her explanation ad-
dressed the compelling interest of section 2 with favorable terms, neither Justice
O'Connor nor any other member of the plurality addressed whether compliance
with section 5 or remedying past racial harm could also be legitimate compel-
ling interests. In addition to compliance with section 2, compliance with section
162. 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily aff'd in part and dism'd in part, 115 S.Ct. 2637
(1995).
163. Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996).
164. Id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
165. See id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor had the most insightful
view into the redistricting process among all of her colleagues, because as of 1995, she was the only Supreme
Court Justice to have also been a state legislator. See Issacharoff, supra note 90, at 66.
166. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
167. See id. at 1969.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1968.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1969.
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5 and remedying past and present racial discrimination have both been regularly
pled in a number of racial gerrymandering cases; however, the plurality's si-
lence will certainly have a chilling effect on states considering compliance with
section 5 and remedying past and present racial discrimination. Nonetheless,
Justice O'Connor exposed herself as a moderate in this racial gerrymander case
by qualifying the significance of intentionally created majority-minority districts
and reassuring that compliance with section 2 is a legitimate compelling inter-
est, while remaining steadfast in her commitment to the Shaw I cause of ac-
tion.'7
C. Dissenters Stay Their Ground
Not surprisingly, the dissent in Bush v. Vera consisted of the same justices
who have dissented in all previous racial gerrymander claims, decided on the
merits.'" Justices Stevens and Souter wrote separate dissenting opinions and
each were joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Each dissent objected to the
racial gerrymandering claim in one form or another, but both expressed approv-
al of the plurality opinion's assertion that the intentional creation of a majority-
minority district alone does snot qualify it as a racial gerrymander.74 Justice
Souter also expressed comfort in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion which
explained forcefully that compliance with section 2 is a compelling interest.7"
Justice Stevens' dissent primarily objected to the plurality's conclusion that
race and not politics was the predominant factor in redistricting.176 He claimed
that incumbency protection was the predominant factor in creating District 30,
the majority African-American district in Dallas.'" Additionally, he asserted
that even if race were used as a proxy to ensure incumbency protection in Dis-
trict 30 that this was not an improper classification because it would not have
been an irrational classification.'" After all, race often is an accurate indica-
tion of a person's political affiliation.'"
However, Justice Stevens was "willing to accept arguendo the plurality's
172. See id. "Although I agree with the dissenters about §2's role as part of our national commitment to
racial equality, I differ from them in my belief that that commitment can and must be reconciled with the
complementary commitment of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to eliminate the unjustified use of
racial stereotypes. At the same time that we combat the symptoms of racial polarization in politics, we must
strive to eliminate unnecessary race-based state action that appears to endorse the disease." Id.
173. But see United States v. Hays, 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995)(not decided on the merits).
174. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1978 & 2003 (1995)("[T]he plurality reasonably concludes
that race-conscious redistricting is not always a form of 'discrimination' to which we should direct our most
skeptical eye.")(Stevens, J., dissenting); ("The Court's move.., is a sound one, as is its continuing recogni-
tion (despite its broad definition of harm) that not every intentional creation of a majority-minority district
requires strict scrutiny.")(Souter, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting in judgment). "roday's opinions do little to solve Shaw's
puzzles or return districting responsibly to the States. To say this is not to denigrate the importance of Justice
O'Connor's position in her separate opinion, ante, at 1968-1969, that compliance with § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act is a compelling state interest; her statement takes a very significant step toward alleviating appre-
hension that Shaw is at odds with the Voting Rights Act." Id.
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conclusion that the Houston districts should be examined with strict scruti-
ny.9" ° Justice Stevens asserted that the districts in Hbuston were more likely
to have been drawn with race as a primary factor because the legislature delib-
erately separated Hispanics from African-Americans.' These districts were
adjacent in some instances and they were purposely drawn to accommodate
black voters in one electoral district and Hispanic voters in another. None-
theless, Justice Stevens asserted that even though the two districts may be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny under Shaw I, they should have passed this standard.'
His claim that they should have passed strict scrutiny was explained as follows;
"if there is no independent constitutional duty to create compact districts in the
first place, and the Court suggests none, there is no reason why noncompact
districts should not be a permissible method of avoiding violations of law."'84
Justice Stevens evinced his frustration with the whole racial gerrymandering
claim by asserting that the Court should not even be addressing this case today
because the issues should be left to "the political branches of our govern-
ment."'8 He stated the political gerrymandering in Texas that sought to pro-
tect partisan interest and incumbents was the "real problem"'86 which should
have been addressed by the Court in this case.
On the other hand, Justice Souter explained at length that the Court should
not even be considering this case because no definable injury exists." Justice
Souter also criticized the plurality for not refining the racial gerrymander cause
of action and developing a clearer standard to aid legislatures seeking to avoid
liability.' 8 He urged the Court to develop a clearer definition of the cause of
action or a more understandable standard. As an illustration, Justice Souter
referred to Baker v. Carrt 89 and its progeny, Reynolds v. Sims.'8 Baker v.
Carr established the justiciability of malapportionment without defining exactly
what comprised a malapportioned electoral district. 9' Two years later, in
Reynolds v. Sims, the Court created the "one person, one vote" bright line stan-
dard to evaluate malapportionment claims." Justice Souter insisted that the
present Court should likewise strive to develop clear guidelines to identify
racial gerrymanders. 93
Justice Souter was adamant in his opposition to conservative members of





185. Id. at 1990.
186. Id. at 1992.
187. Id. at 2000-03.
188. "ITihe combined plurality, minority, and Court opinions do not ultimately leave the law dealing with
a Shaw claim appreciably clearer or more manageable than Shaw I itself did. Id. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing).
189. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
190. 377 U.S. 533, (1964).
191. See id.
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the Court who suggest that the Court should adopt the principle of
colorblindness in this and similar cases. 94 Justice Souter expressed his con-
cern over Justice Scalia's call for the acceptance of the Court's
colorblindness, 95 but was reassured by Justice O'Connor's assertion that
"race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional."'" In addition to
explaining his discomfort with the amorphous standard that continues in Bush v.
Vera, Justice Souter claimed that there are only two solutions: either "confine
the cause of action by adopting a quantifiable shape test or... eliminate the
cause of action entirely."'" Justice Souter asserted that a shape test would
provide guidance by establishing a standard "calculated on the basis of a
district's dispersion, perimeter, and population."'95
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Racial Gerrymander Harm Is Real
The plurality arrived at the correct decision in Bush v. Vera. The "expres-
sive harm' t identified in Shaw I is real. Harm exists when electoral districts
are primarily drawn according to race; the message sent to the elected officials
and their constituency is that the elected official represents the interests of the
group rather that the interests of all the constituents as a whole. If our democra-
cy wishes to have elected officials represent groups of people based on interests
rather than geography, then a true form of proportional representation should be
created, similar to the ones used by the national parliaments in most European
countries. However, at the moment, a public outcry for a true national pro-
portional representation system does not exist, and until such a demand for
proportional representation exists, electoral districts should exist to represent the
entire constituency rather than only one interest group in the district, leaving
those not in the interest group effectively unrepresented.
The three challenged districts in Bush v. Vera impress most commentators
as well as the plurality of the Court as incomprehensible to the constituents of
the districts. These districts are jagged, elongated, and inconsistent. Constituents
who live in these districts surely are confused as to which district they reside
194. Id. at 2010. Justice Souter revealed his strong opposition by referring to "the irony that the price of
imposing a principle of colorblindness in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment would be[,] submerging the
votes of those whom the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to protect[.]" Id.
195. See id. at 2011 (Souter refers to Scalia's concurrence in Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
520-521 where he criticizes "the majority for rejecting a strict principle of colorblindness" according to Jus-
tice Souter).
196. Id. (quoting Justice O'Connor in Shaw 1).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2010.
199. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
200. The United States is unique among Western democracies by not utilizing proportional representation
to elect the national parliamentary body. Countries of English heritage are typically the only countries that do
not use proportional representation, whereas almost all the democracies in continental Europe use some form
of proportional representation to elect their national parliament.
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in, i.e., the districts lack "cognizability".e 1 A large number of the constituents
who live on the perimeter (which is exceptionally long due to the erratic draw-
ing of it) of these electoral districts may talk to their neighbors about their
voting preferences not realizing that they are represented by a different elected
official than their neighbor across the street. Even worse, they may not
know for which candidates they are voting.' Confusion is a concern because
as one commentator suggests, the "districts can be so far from cognizable that
they violate what we might think of as a due process component of equal pro-
tection by damaging the potential for 'fair and effective representation.
' as
This confusion could be avoided if districts were drawn with the traditional
respect for geography.
However, of a greater concern than voters' confusion about the district in
which they reside is the racial gerrymander's role in compromising minority
representation. It has suggested that effective representation of minorities in
Congress is at an all time low despite the record number of minorities in Con-
gress today.' The explanation for this paradox rests in the attitudes of the
present Congress. Though "[b]etween 1982 and 1992, the number of congres-
sional districts in which minorities constituted a numerical majority doubled,
from twenty-six to fifty two,"' the increase is largely attributed to the larger
number of majority-minority districts. The creation of a large number of majori-
ty-minority districts after the 1990 decennial census involved race-conscious
gerrymandering that took black constituents out of districts which used to be
represented by a white congressman. Now these white congressmen are of-
ten not as responsive to the remaining minority constituents who do not exist in
adequate numbers to determine the outcome of primaries and general elections.
Whereas, in the past, many white congressmen were concerned about adequate-
ly representing their minority constituents, they now are not as concerned about
earning minority support for reelection. The added number of minority con-
201. "'[Clognizability' [means] the ability to characterize the district boundaries in a manner that can be
readily communicated to ordinary citizens of the district in common sense terms based on geographical refer-
ents." Bernard Grofman, supra note 58, at 1262.
202. "Permitting the construction of districts, whose boundaries are simply not definable in commonsense
terms, vitiates the principle that representatives are to be elected from geographically defined districts and
vitiates the advantages of such districts as the basis of electoral choice." Id. at 1263.
203. The plurality illustrated this problem with examples. "Campaigners seeking to visit their constituents
'had to carry a map to identify the district lines, because so often the borders would move from block to
block'; voters 'did not know the candidates running for office' because they did not know which district they
lived in." Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1959(quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
204. Grofnan, supra note 58, at 1262.
205. Interview with Gary Allison, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, in Tulsa, Okla.
(Sept. 1996)
206. Jamie B. Raskin, supra note 3, at 526.
207. Two prominent explanations exist to explain the reasoning behind grouping minorities like this:
First, commentators in national news journals, editorials, and op-ed articles have claimed that the
Voting Rights Act-as enforced by the DOJ-is a "Republican conspiracy" to siphon off black voters
into heavily black districts in order to "whiten" the remaining districts so as to make it more likely
that Republicans will be elected. Second, others claim that the Voting Rights Act has been used to
maximize the number of seats in which a minority candidate will virtually be assured of election, and
thus has become a kind of quota system.
Bernard Grofman, supra note 58, at 1248. (footnotes omitted).
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gressmen failed to compensate for the influence lost when a number of white
congressmen no longer concerned themselves with the needs of their smaller
minority constituency."°
Additionally, the practice of drawing electoral districts with race as the
primary factor may lead to the Balkanization of races, which is hardly a for-
ward motion in the nation's effort to encourage a harmonious multiracial soci-
ety. Shaw I previously alluded to this and described it as "uncomfortable resem-
blance to political apartheid."' When electoral districts are drawn with race
as the primary factor it may encourage African-Americans to continue to live or
congregate in all black neighborhoods rather than to risk losing their political
power.2 0 The Bush v. Vera plurality appropriately points out that "[i]f our so-
ciety is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize
that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and caus-
es continued hurt and injury."'
The Bush v. Vera plurality opinion reassures state legislatures that race
may be a consideration when conducting reapportionment and will not be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny as long as it is not the prevailing consideration." 2 This
approach is reasonable because it allows race to be utilized as a factor in reap-
portionment plans-in an effort to abide by the mandates of the VRA of color-
conscious districting-while also providing a reasonable limit to restrict the
abuse of color-conscious districting. Additionally, the Shaw I harm is avoided,
whereby elected officials represent only a group's interest rather than their
whole constituency.
B. Uniqueness of the Bush v. Vera Decision Provides Guidance
Bush v. Vera and Shaw II are companion cases in that the Court consid-
ered the same three compelling interests in each case. Nonetheless, significant
distinctions exist between the two cases. Bush v. Vera deals with more issues
and provides significantly more guidance than Shaw H and all previous racial
gerrymander cases. This is due partly to the unique circumstances surrounding
the challenged districts in Bush v. Vera.
Most significantly, Bush v. Vera is the first Supreme Court decision re-
garding racial gerrymandering which resulted in a plurality."3 With the excep-
208. Interview with Gary Allison, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, in Tulsa, Okla.
(Sept. 1996)
209. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
210. Interview with Gary Allison, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, in Tulsa, Okla.
(Sept. 1996).
211. Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1964 (1996)(quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 630-31 (1991)).
212. "Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of rae"
Id. at 1951 (quoting Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 630). "Nor does it apply to all cases of intentional creation of major-
ity-minority districts." Id.
213. Justice O'Connor wrote the Bush v. Vera plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy. See id., (plurality opinion). The Court decided the following racial gerrymandering cases by
a majority: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); and Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996).
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tion of Bush v. Vera, all Supreme Court opinions regarding racial gerrymander-
ing claims have been majority opinions. Of those determined on the merits, 14
all included a bare majority of the same five justices.2 5 In Bush v. Vera, Jus-
tices Thomas and Scalia broke rank, objecting to the plurality's view that the
creation of a majority-minority district in itself does not call for strict scruti-
ny.21 6 The plurality's position on this issue dissolved the consistent majority
that had existed in every racial gerrymander case prior to Bush v. Vera, reveal-
ing the swing votes in future racial gerrymander cases.
The lower court decision from which Bush v. Vera originates, Vera v.
Richards, may have contributed to the plurality's new approach to the racial
gerrymander claim. In Vera v. Richards, a panel of judges examined four ma-
jority-minority districts, finding only three to be racial gerrymanders."7 The
panel found that Congressional District 28 was not a racial gerrymander, al-
though it was intentionally created as a majority-minority district for the large
Hispanic population in South Texas.2 8 On appeal, the Supreme Court in Bush
v. Vera did not directly address Congressional District 28 on the merits because
it was not appealed as an issue.219 However, it may have served as an impetus
for the plurality's bold statement that not all majority-minority districts will
automatically be racial gerrymanders. In any event, Congressional District 28
appears to be a prime example of the principle announced in the plurality opin-
ion-that the intentional creation of a majority-minority district in itself does
not establish a racial gerrymander-and serves as an example of what Justice
O'Connor may have had in mind as a constitutionally drawn majority-minority
district.
In Bush v. Vera, for the first time ever, Justice O'Connor stressed her
contention that compliance with section 2 of the VRA is a compelling state
interest.' This reassurance did not exist in the plurality opinion, but it did in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. In every racial gerrymandering decision
214. For example, United States v. Hays included the same five justices and others, but concluded that the
plaintiffs did not have standing and left the issue of racial gerrymandering unresolved. See Hays, 515 U.S. at
747.
215. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia constituted the major-
ity in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995); and Shaw v. Hunt, 116
S.Ct. 1894 (1996).
216. "I can not agree with Justice [O'Connor's] assertion that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the inten-
tional creation of majority-minority districts." Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
When the Court first acknowledged the racial gerrymandering claim in Shaw I, it explained that "the Court
expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always
gives rise to an equal protection claim." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 631. However, the plurality opinion in Bush v.
Vera does express a view on the intentional creation of majority-minority districts by stating: "[Strict scrutiny
does not] apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts." Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1951
(plurality opinion). Although Justice Kennedy joined the plurality decision in Bush v. Vera, he did not consid-
er himself bound to the statement and objected to its discussion in the plurality opinion. See id. at 1971 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
217. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp. 1304, 1344 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd. sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116
S.Ct. 1941 (1996).
218. See id.
219. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996) (plurality opinion).
220. "I write separately to express my view on two points. First, compliance with the results test of § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling interest" Id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 33:613
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except for Bush v. Vera, no such assurance existed in the Court's majority
opinion or even in the concurring opinion of a majority member writing sepa-
rately.' It appears that Justice O'Connor is prepared to align herself with the
four justices who disapprove of the racial gerrymander claim, in order to protect
section 2 of the VRA.
Bush v. Vera also has the distinction of being the first case where the
Supreme Court declared a majority-Hispanic district to be a racial gerryman-
der.m To date, the Supreme Court has only considered majority-African-
American districts under the Shaw I claim.' Although the Court's consider-
ation of a majority-Hispanic district is significant, even more noteworthy is the
Court's evaluation of adjacent majority-minority districts, each composed of a
different minority group. A majority of the members of the Court apparently
agree that the purposeful division of one minority group from another by care-
fully drafting them into adjacent majority-minority districts provides conclusive
proof that race was a predominant factor in drafting each district. 4
By expanding on the Shaw I claim through new principles announced in
the plurality decision and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, Bush v. Vera
reflects the Court's rational approach to majority-minority districts. In addition,
the unique characteristics of the case, including the consideration of Hispanic
districts in the racial gerrymandering context, led the Court to conclusions never
reached before. By reading the decision both literally, and between the lines,
legislatures receive additional guidance to assist them in meeting the demands
of the VRA on the one hand, and avoiding liability through a racial gerryman-
der claim on the other.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
While color-conscious districting (commentators differ on whether this is
actually affirmative action ) has served the useful purpose of enabling minor-
221. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996). "Just as in Miller, this Court does not here reach the
question whether compliance with the Act, on its own, can be a compelling state interest under the proper
circumstances." Id. at 1898.
222. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1941(plurality opinion)(regarding two majority-African-American districts and
one majority-Hispanic district).
223. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (regarding two majority-African American districts); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (regarding one majority-African-American district); United States v. Hays,
515 U.S. 737 (1995) (regarding one majority-African-American district); Shaw, 116 S.Ct at 1894 (regarding
one majority-African-American district).
224. See Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1958-60 (plurality opinion). Even one of the dissenters, Justice Stevens, like-
wise summarizes the apparent implications of these adjacent majority-minority districts separating two differ-
ent ethnic groups: "The Houston districts present a closer question on the application of strict scrutiny....
T]here is... evidence that the interlocking shapes of the Houston districts were specifically, and almost
exclusively, the result of an effort to create, out of largely integrated communities, both a majority-black and
a majority-Hispanic district." Id at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. "[1]f 'affirmative action' means, as it often has come to mean, not just equal treatment, but that the
claims of minorities are given more weight than those of identically situated whites, then it is clearly inaccu-
rate to characterize voting rights remedies as affirmative action." Bernard Grofman, supra note 58, at 1247.
Affirmative Action in the context of voting rights would entail that an advantage be given to minorities. In
these cases, minorities do not receive an advantage but simply the same chance to elect minorities as whites
19971
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ities to participate effectively in the political process, race-conscious districting
has the potential to be abused. Justice O'Connor expresses this concern and
her belief that state legislatures can use race appropriately in her concurring
opinion in Bush v. Vera, but that the use of race should be kept in check.'
With this in mind, it is appropriate that beneficial race consciousness of govern-
ment action should receive strict scrutiny, especially in cases of race-conscious
district drawing.
If a legitimate goal necessitates race-conscious districting, it should survive
strict scrutiny.' In Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand, where she stated
her desire to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact,"' she reassured that strict scrutiny may be satisfied in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 9 She likewise reassured the drafters of congressional districts
that if race is determined to be the primary factor in drawing congressional
districts, it may satisfy strict scrutiny upon a showing the existence of a com-
pelling interest, narrowly tailored."ao The standards for satisfying the narrow
tailoring requirement are high but they are not impossible to achieve. The plu-
rality is.not looking for perfection in narrow tailoring; they are simply looking
for a good faith effort and something close to this will likely satisfy strict scru-
tiny.ra Despite claims to the contrary,aa Justice O'Connor maintains a mod-
erate position on racial issues and her position as a swing vote should reassure
those who are concerned about the future validity of the VRA.
have to elect a white official.
226. A prominent commentator in this field eloquently explains in his own words, "Certainly, I do not
wish to reduce the protections now afforded minorities by the Voting Rights Act.... Still, I believe that it is
undesirable to draw districts that run helter-skelter the course of a state, picking up noncontiguous pockets of
minorities, cutting up cities as with a scalpel, in the fashion of North Carolina's 12th Congressional District;
there may even be circumstances where such districts violate due process or equal protection." Bernard
Grofman, supra note 58, at 1260-61. Bernard Grofman published this article just before the Court announced
the Shaw I cause of action, and in this sense seemed to predict accurately the development of the essence of a
Shaw I claim.
227. "1 believe that the States, playing a primary role, and courts, in their secondary role, are capable of
distinguishing the appropriate and reasonably necessary uses of race from its unjustified and excessive uses."
Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1970.
228. "[W]e subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that scrutiny is necessary to
determine whether they are benign." Id. at 1963.
229. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
230. "I write separately to express my own view on two points. First, compliance with the results test of
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest. Second, that test can co-exist in principle
and in practice with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 ... (1993), and its progeny, as elaborated in today's opin-
ions." Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 1968 (O'Connor's concurring opinion).
231. An example of this flexibility is in the plurality's statement: "We also reaffirm that the 'narrow
tailoring' requirement of strict scrutiny allows the States a limited degree of leeway in furthering such inter-
est. ... We thus reject, as impossibly stringent, the District Court's view of the narrow tailoring requirement,
that 'a district must have the least possible amount of irregularity in shape, making allowances for traditional
districting criteria.' "Id. at 1960.
232. "The cover story for the undercover operation of restoring white political supremacy is the almost
comical constitutionalization by Justice O'Connor of the empty platitude that 'appearances do matter."' Jamie
B. Raskin, supra note 3, at 529 (footnote omitted)(referring to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
233. "If you look closely at O'Connor's opinions, you will find that she has taken significantly more
moderate positions in all of the cases than those of her more conservative colleagues. In her concurrence in
the redistricting decision, Miller v. Johnson, for example, O'Connor made the point that 'customary and
traditional' factors could legitimately be taken into consideration in redistricting as well as could race." James
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Commentators claiming that the VRA may be ruled unconstitutional or
virtually ineffective are exaggerating the effects of Shaw I and its predeces-
sors.24 Under Bush v. Vera, the VRA is preserved in its original form, and
section 2 still exists as an effective tool for minorities to challenge redistricting
that amounts to vote dilution. The four dissenters would certainly align them-
selves with Justice O'Connor to form a majority in an effort to insure that sec-
tion 2 does not become a dead letter. 5 On the other hand, although
O'Connor did not express the same commitment to section 5, there should be
no question whether section 5 will be upheld as a compelling interest to insure
that the covered states do not revert to the old and contemptible methods of
denying minorities an opportunity to participate in the political process. Section
5 remains effective within the limited use envisioned by Congress, but it was
never intended to be a reason to create majority-minority districts. Previous ra-
cial gerrymandering decisions do not accept the interpretation of some states
and the Department of Justice that compliance with section 5 would ever re-
quire the creation of a majority-minority district, but the Court has never stated
or implied that the nonretrogression requirement might be unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion evidences that she will continue to
be the swing vote and that she fortunately maintains a rational approach to-
wards the balancing of the twin demands of the VRA and the equal protection
clause."se She is steadfast in her commitment to racial equality, 7 and the
dissenters would certainly vote with O'Connor to uphold the principle an-
nounced by the plurality that the intentional creation of a majority-minority
district in itself does not invoke strict scrutiny. Thus while ardent supporters of
the VRA claim that the Court would possibly render it ineffective, Justice
O'Connor has made it clear that the VRA should remain a powerful tool but
also explains that necessary limits must exist to restrain its improper use.
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia are the leading advocates on the Court
for a colorblind society."s9 In Bush v. Vera, Justice Thomas objected to the
F. Simon, Politics and the Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y.L.ScH.L. REv., 863, 872-73 (1996) (citations omitted).
234. "The critical cases eroding the Voting Rights Act have been Shaw v. Reno and, and even more deci-
sively, Miller v. Johnson." Jamie B. Raskin, supra note 3, at 526 (referring to principal racial gerrymander
cases)(citations omitted).
235. Justice O'Connor's "view that compliance with § 2 is (not just arguendo) a compelling state interest
and her statement of that position virtually insulate the Voting Rights Act from jeopardy under Shaw as
such." Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 2007 (1996)(Souter, J., dissenting).
236. Justice O'Connor has earned a reputation as the pivotal vote in previous racial gerrymander cases.
One commentator succinctly summarizes her position as "[u]nwilling to call a halt to all beneficial uses of
racial classifications to remediate societal inequities, but also deeply troubled by the increasing evidence of
racial factionalism, O'Connor demands primarily that the use of race not be excessive." Samuel Issacharoff,
supra note 90, at 64.
237. "I agree with the dissenters about §2's role as part of our national commitment to racial equality[.]"
Bush, 116 S.Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor's concurring opinion).
238. "[W]hat legislators once thought was their statutory obligation under the Voting Rights Act-to shape
majority-minority districts where possible and to state their intention to do so-is now grounds for having all
their efforts struck down as unconstitutional." Jamie B. Raskin, supra note 3, at 532.
239. "Of the present Court majority, only Justices SCALIA and THOMAS are on record as concluding
that any intentional creation of a majority-minority district is a forbidden racial gerrymander." Bush, 116 S.Ct.
at 2011 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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principle adopted by the plurality that the intentional creation of a majority-
minority district alone does not qualify it as a racial gerrymander.2" Unlike
Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas believed that the creation of a majority-mi-
nority district necessarily implies that race was the predominant factor and thus
is an improper racial classification subject to strict scrutiny. In another opinion,
Justice Scalia was also hostile to racial considerations, as revealed in his
Adarand concurrence, where he asserts that "government can never have a
'compelling interest' in discrimination on the basis of race in order to 'make
up for past racial discrimination." 41
Fortunately, most of the justices do not agree that to achieve a colorblind
society we should become colorblind now. While a colorblind society is a wor-
thy objective and may indeed be a possibility one day, it is not practical in
today's society. Minorities are still dramatically under-represented in the politi-
cal process, not to mention disadvantaged from an economic stand point. Race-
consciousness is essential to understanding the realities of minority participation
in our multiracial society and to encouraging the equal participation of minori-
ties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Race-conscious electoral districting advances the worthy objective of pro-
tecting and promoting the minority voting franchise, but can overstep its pur-
pose and lead to the harm identified in Shaw L The efforts to draw electoral
districts with highly irregular boundaries will certainly be recognized by its
current proponents in twenty years as egregious. The extremes that race-con-
scious redistricting reached after the 1990 census were excessive and represent
an abuse of the VRA. However, the proper application of the Shaw I cause of
action serves to insure the VRA's proper application and limit its abuse .by
overzealous proponents. Race may, and should, be considered in drawing elec-
toral lines, but not to the excessive extent as in the racial gerrymandering cases
recently considered by the Supreme Court.
Although little unanimity exists when considering racial gerrymander cas-
es, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bush v. Vera reveals enough votes
exist to protect the VRA's progress. Justice O'Connor emphasized the principle
that the intentional creation of a minority-majority district does not automatical-
ly qualify it as a racial gerrymander and that compliance with section 2 can be
a compelling interest. The four dissenters in Bush v. Vera find the racial gerry-
mander claim objectionable, so they would certainly vote with Justice O'Connor
to protect electoral districts that meet her relaxed standards. The fracture within
240. "In my view, application of strict scrutiny in this case was never a close question. I cannot agree
with Justice O'CONNOR's assertion that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the intentional creation of majority-
minority districts.... Only last term, in Adarand ... , we vigorously asserted that all government racial
classifications must be strictly scrutinized." Id. at 1972 (footnotes omitted).
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Bush v. Vera actually serves as an effective way to check the VRA's proper
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